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AbSTrACT
There has been a global decline in tobacco consumption 
that, if continued, will negatively impact the tobacco 
industry’s profits. This decline led the industry to 
invent and market new products, including heated 
tobacco products (HTP). HTP are an extension of the 
industry’s strategies to undermine government’s tobacco 
regulatory efforts as they are being promoted as part 
of the solution for the tobacco epidemic. Under the 
moniker of ’harm reduction’, the tobacco companies 
are attempting to rehabilitate their reputation so they 
can more effectively influence governments to roll back 
existing tobacco control policies or create exemptions 
for their HTP. Rolling back tobacco control policies will 
make it easier for the companies to renormalise tobacco 
use to increase social acceptability for all their products. 
When regulations are absent or when loopholes exist in 
classifying HTP as a tobacco product (thus subject to all 
tobacco control regulations), the industry’s marketing 
of HTP is making these products more visible to the 
public and more accessible. Governments need to ensure 
that HTP are regulated as tobacco products or drugs 
and reject partnerships with the tobacco companies 
to promote ’harm reduction’. The tobacco companies 
remain the vector of the tobacco-caused epidemic and 
cannot be part of the global tobacco control solution.
InTroduCTIon
As of April 2018, Philip Morris International (PMI), 
British American Tobacco (BAT) and Japan Tobacco 
International (JTI) were aggressively promoting 
their ‘heated tobacco products’ (HTP, also called 
‘heat-not-burn’ heated tobacco, smoke-free tobacco 
and other ‘less risky’ products around the world 
(table 1). Marketing for these products and media 
accounts of HTP launches in different countries 
explicitly state or imply that they are safer than 
cigarettes.1–6 In a few instances, marketing materials 
claim that HTP are potentially helpful to smokers 
who want to quit.6
In the USA, claims of reduced risk (what US law 
calls a Modified Risk Tobacco Product or MRTP) 
must be approved by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) before a tobacco company can market 
a product with reduced exposure or risk claims.7 
In December 2016, PMI submitted a request to the 
FDA to market IQOS, one of its HTP as a MRTP, 
claiming that it is a reduced risk tobacco product. 
The application to sell in the USA without these 
claims falls under a different process.7 In particular, 
despite evidence to the contrary in their MRTP 
application,8–10 PMI claimed that smokers who 
switch completely to IQOS would experience a 
reduction in the health-related risks associated with 
smoking.11 12 In January 2018, the FDA Tobacco 
Product Scientific Advisory Committee recom-
mended against FDA approval of reduced risk 
claims for IQOS.13 This paper provides an overview 
of the global HTP market, the marketing claims that 
tobacco companies are making when promoting 
HTP, and the policy implications of HTP within the 
context of the tobacco industry’s ongoing efforts 
to disrupt tobacco control progress. IQOS and the 
other HTP products represent a continuation of the 
tobacco industry’s documented strategies to under-
mine effective tobacco control, including successful 
implementation of the WHO Framework Conven-
tion on Tobacco Control (FCTC).
Plans to rapidly introduce heated tobacco 
products
As of April 2018, the industry was rapidly intro-
ducing new HTP.14 15 In December 2014, PMI 
became the first company to make a large-scale 
launch of HTP, promoting IQOS. In Italy, rapid 
market penetration led to an increase in IQOS use, 
including intent to use IQOS among non-smokers 
and long-term former smokers who would other-
wise remain tobacco-free.16 17 In the case of 
never smokers, HTP has the potential to cause 
harm, despite the tobacco companies’ claim to 
the contrary.16 The finding that non-smokers and 
former smokers are using IQOS illustrates how 
the introduction of HTP can compound the harms 
caused by other tobacco products.
PMI built a US$120 million production facility 
in Switzerland and announced, in June 2017 the 
building of a US$320 million facility in Germany5 
focused entirely on the development and produc-
tion of HTP. PMI announced plans to double 
production capacity from 50 billion heatsticks 
(the disposable tobacco stick that fits in the IQOS 
device) in 2017 to 100 billion sticks in 2018.15 In 
Japan, IQOS quickly gained market share, reaching 
10% of the tobacco market in less than 1 year. In 
2017, JTI responded with the launch of Ploom 
TECH,1 followed by BAT’s glo.18
We do not know the exact number of countries 
where the tobacco industry is seeking approval 
to introduce HTPs in 2018, but a 115 page 2014 
presentation by PMI Research and Development 
titled ‘Reduced Risk Products Briefing’19 released 
by Reuters14 indicates that PMI aimed to reach 
50 markets by the end of 2018. It appears that 
PMI selected the top 50 markets after considering 
volume of cigarettes sold, existing product regula-
tion, the ‘economical, political and legal environ-
ment’ and likelihood of commercial success.19 BAT 
stated on its website in 2017 that it planned to have 
its ‘potentially reduced risk products’ in 40 markets 
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Table 1 Availability of HTP by major cigarette company and country of availability (January 2018)
Company Product Year launched Countries/Comments
British American Tobacco91 iFuse* glo 2015
2016
Romania, Japan, Switzerland, Canada, South Korea, Russia
China National Tobacco Corporation 
/ SMTA92
Not reported Not launched A few of the companies claim to have over 30 patents of HTP and continue to be engaged in 
research and development of these products. But none yet are in the market.
Imperial Brands93 Not reported Not launched Focusing on e-cigarettes at the moment, claims to have options to launch when it deems that time 
is right
Japan Tobacco International31 Ploom TECH† 2016 Japan, Switzerland
KT&G Corp.94 lil 2017 South Korea
Philip Morris International‡ 6 IQOS
TEEPS§
2014
Not yet launched
Canada, Guatemala, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, 
Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Monaco, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, UK, South Africa, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand
*It is unclear that iFuse will remain in the market in Romania, where Glo was introduced in 2018.
†Ploom TECH is described as a hybrid between a HTP and a vaporiser. It is to be used with Mevius capsules. Mevius is one of JTI’s best-selling cigarette brands. The capsules 
contain tobacco which are then heated by vapour.
‡PMI website states that it is developing a new heated nicotine delivery product that has no tobacco, STEEM, among other ‘reduced risk’ products.
§ We do not know what TEEPS stands for, it is not included in the product’s description (https://www.pmi.com/smoke-free-products/teeps-carbon-heated-tobacco-product).
HTP, heated tobacco product.
by the end of 2018.4 In April 2018, PMI shares dropped in value 
subsequent to its announcement of an earlier than expected 
plateauing of the Japanese IQOS market.20
regulatory considerations
A 2017 Reuters investigation found that before launching IQOS 
in a country, PMI engaged with high level government officials 
in attempts to convince regulators that IQOS had health benefits 
and therefore should not be subject to the same regulatory restric-
tions as cigarettes, including marketing, labelling and taxation.14 
As Martin King, PMI’s Asia President told Asia Times in a 2017 
interview: ‘Ensuring the right market infrastructure and regula-
tory frameworks are in place is essential to our overall launch 
schedule for Asia. Fundamentally, any potentially less-harmful 
alternative to cigarettes needs to be recognised by regulators 
and consumers as different from cigarettes—taxed differently, 
labelled differently, and with the freedom to communicate the 
product attributes openly; only then can smokers have the infor-
mation they need to encourage them to switch to a smoke-free 
alternative’ .2 Similarly, in 2017 Ruth Dempsey, PMI’s Director 
for Regulatory and Scientific Affairs, told the Costa Rican news-
paper Imprensa Libre that existing regulations in some countries 
make it difficult for PMI to launch IQOS and suggested that 
countries needed to change their regulatory frameworks to allow 
PMI to communicate with consumers and explain the advan-
tages of IQOS.3
In 2017 in Colombia, the Vice President of PMI affiliate 
Coltobaco, Humberto Mora, lamented that legislation they 
supposed to treat HTP differently than other tobacco products 
did not pass a Senate Committee. He stated that lacking specific 
regulation, the company’s goal was to ensure that minors did not 
buy the product.21 Mora also claimed that HTP did not generate 
any toxic components associated with cardiovascular diseases 
and cancer.22
In March 2017, the Ministry of Health of Israel allowed 
IQOS to enter the market without any restrictions that are appli-
cable to cigarettes and exempted from the tax scheme for other 
tobacco products.23 These decisions generated a strong protest 
from health advocacy groups who filed a court case to protest 
the Ministry’s decision.24 The announcement also ran counter 
previous statements by the Health Ministry’s legal advisor. In 
January 2018, the Ministry reversed its position and convinced 
the Minister of Finance to announce that HTPs would be taxed 
similarly to cigarettes.25
As of April 2018, there were a range of regulatory approaches 
to HTP and most of the countries being targeted by the industry 
for launching HTP were facing the challenge of regulating HTP 
under existing tobacco control laws that may not explicitly 
include HTP, which may have made it easier for the companies 
to open up loopholes in existing laws to evade regulations that 
apply to all other tobacco products. At a minimum, all claims 
of harm reduction must be proven with robust, independent 
evidence,26 and all regulatory measures of the FCTC should be 
applicable to the packaging, taxation, sales and marketing of 
HTP.7
Marketing heated tobacco products
Marketing of these products, and claims being made about them, 
need to be regulated.7 27 In 2016 in Japan, the appearance of 
IQOS in a popular television programme was followed by a 
rapid increase in IQOS use, highlighting the need to regulate 
HTP marketing and use.28 The agency that represented the TV 
celebrities that included IQOS on their television show stated 
that ‘they received absolutely no payment from Philip Morris 
or affiliated companies’ to discuss IQOS on their show’.29 In 
Canada, where marketing restrictions exists, PMI is using a 
series of direct to consumers marketing strategies, including 
events, and claims of a ‘smoke-free future’, highlighting the 
need for governments to develop regulatory framework around 
marketing claims.30
The tobacco companies are using a series of claims in the 
marketing of HTP. Both in websites and statements to the media 
and investors, HTP are presented as less harmful but not risk-
free. Some media accounts of product launches state that HTP 
reduce the levels of harmful tobacco components by 90%–95% 
compared with cigarettes, while others emphasise the lack of 
odour or visible emissions as part of marketing campaigns. It 
is important to note that as of April 2018, there is no evidence 
to confirm this claimed 90%–95% lower level of harm. Other 
marketing claims highlight that these products produce no 
smoke, that is, are smoke-free. Implied in these claims, in ads 
and stores globally, is that smokers should switch from cigarettes 
to these new, allegedly less harmful, products.
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Reduced harm
In a July 2017 press release, JTI also claimed a 99% reduction 
on a list of tobacco product constituents that have been identi-
fied as harmful by WHO’s Tobacco Product Regulation Expert 
Group.31 In a December 2017 press release, BAT made a similar 
claim for its HTP, glo, in Romania, where in addition to the 
90%–95% reduction in harmful components, BAT claimed that 
the new product was aligned with WHO’s recommendations 
for regulating tobacco products content.32 BAT qualified the 
90%–95% claim with a footnote stating that this was based on 
an analysis of nine ‘harmful components’ in cigarettes that the 
WHO had identified as target for reduction. WHO responded 
with a statement in February 2018, stating that WHO was ‘in 
no way endorsing BAT’s product nor the company’s claims 
concerning the product’.33
Smoke-free
In 2017 in South Africa,34 35 PMI emphasised HTP as ‘smoke-
free’ in its marketing. At the opening of an IQOS store in Cape 
Town PMI capitalising on the fact that South African law does 
not require 100% smoke-free public places (by allowing for 
designated smoking areas), Blaine Dodds, Head of Marketing 
for Reduced Risk Products at Philip Morris South Africa stated 
that the company was
extremely excited to partner with these malls which have agreed 
to allow the trial of this product indoors. The HeatSticks or 
heated tobacco units inserted in the IQOS device are not ignited, 
only heated and therefore do not generate smoke. The indoor 
air quality is not negatively impacted by the aerosol. This affords 
PMSA the opportunity to leverage the area of the store to 
demonstrate a smoke-free future to South Africans.34
A footnote in the press release that quotes Dodds states that 
‘IQOS is not risk free. The best way to reduce tobacco related 
health risks is to quit tobacco use altogether’.34
A June 2017 JTI press release emphasised the lack of odour 
from Ploom TECH in an effort to ensure that indoor use is not 
restricted.1
In sum, by 2018, the tobacco companies were promoting HTP, 
globally as a reduced harm product and an option to address 
the tobacco epidemic. As in previous attempts of the tobacco 
industry to be a stakeholder in tobacco control,36–39 these 
marketing efforts were providing the tobacco companies with 
access to decision makers and opinion leaders, continuing the 
industry’s efforts to influence the policy process to protect its 
profits.
Scientific and political engagement
The tobacco companies use HTP products as part of their 
broader political and public relations activities to position them 
as ‘partners’ to address the tobacco epidemic rather than as the 
vectors that are causing it. This is a similar strategy previously 
used by the tobacco industry to promote itself as a partner of 
public health in reducing the harms of tobacco, while obfuscating 
the scientific evidence pointing that harm reduction is achieved 
through tobacco control policies that decrease consumption.39
PMI’s 2014 internal ‘10 year Corporate Affairs Objectives 
and Strategies’40 released as part of a series of investigations 
by Reuters outlines PMI’s strategies to support its ‘combustible 
and reduced risk (RPP) product businesses’. The strategy docu-
ment provided a series of examples of activities to renormalise 
its business to regain access to the political and policy discus-
sions related to tobacco control. One of the key objectives was to 
‘establish PMI as a trusted and indispensable partner, leading its 
sector and bringing solutions to the table’. Another key objective 
was to ‘define and pave the way for the right fiscal and regula-
tory frameworks to secure PMI’s RPP portfolio as the pathway 
for future growth’.40
According to this ‘confidential internal use only’ plan, PMI’s 
‘external engagement’ plans were:
1. Establish the concept of harm reduction as legitimate public 
policy in tobacco regulation.
2. Establish the legitimacy of tobacco companies to be a part of 
the regulatory debate on RRPs [reduced risk products](‘part 
of solution’).
3. Leverage PMI’s innovation and scientific research to estab-
lish credibility with stakeholders.
4. Identify and engage non-traditional third party stakeholders/
allies (e-cigarette manufacturers and retailers, adult consum-
ers of RPP products, tobacco harm reduction advocates, sci-
entific community) globally and locally.
5. Develop compelling messages and materials to support our 
advocacy on RPP issues.
6. Amplify and leverage the debate on harm reduction around 
global events (eg, COP6).
7. Continue to engage with regulators globally.40
As discussed below, these strategies echo the tobacco industry’s 
decades-long efforts to undermine tobacco control and present 
itself as an ‘indispensable’ partner in all policy discussions.
The 2014 presentation by PMI titled ‘Reduced Risk Products 
Briefing’19 released by Reuters14 (figure 1) described how PMI 
planned to invoke the tobacco industry’s usual tools to influ-
ence the scientific and policy debate around tobacco control: 
funding of science, global media and public relations campaigns, 
use of consultants and support for individuals and groups 
that it perceives as adequate spokespeople for the company’s 
message.41–46
PMI released a full-page advertisement in newspapers on 
2 January 2018 in the UK claiming that PMI was ‘trying to give 
up cigarettes’.47 In the ad, PMI explicitly expressed a desire to 
partner with local and national governmental authorities to 
support cessation services, including seeking ‘governmental; 
approval to insert, directly into our cigarette packs, informa-
tion on quitting and on switching’.47 The advertisement did not 
mention HTP directly, but did pledge to ‘expand the availability 
of new, alternative products in the UK’.47 PMI also launched a 
website, nominally to communicate with smokers about quitting 
regular cigarettes called ‘smoke-free future’ (only available for 
consumers in the UK as of April 2018). PMI’s communications 
surrounding HTP emphasised the company’s nominal goal of a 
smoke free future, which is similar to the name of the Founda-
tion for a Smoke-Free World PMI created and funded in 2017.
Foundation for a smoke-free world
As an apparent element of PMI’s plan to expand the market for 
its HTP as well as rehabilitate the company’s reputation, in 2017 
PMI committed almost US$1 billion (US$80 million per year for 
12 years48) to create the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World.49 
The foundation website stated that its goal was to ultimately 
eliminate smoking worldwide and ‘advancing the dialogue 
on smoking cessation and harm reduction’.49 The foundation 
website also stated that it was in the process of developing a 
research agenda, after which it would release a call for research 
proposals. The new foundation has a strong goal of promoting 
HTP as a harm reduction alternative to smoking, in alignment 
with PMI’s strategy to engage with the scientific community and 
‘amplify’ the debate on harm reduction.36 37
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Figure 1 PMI’s tools to expand access to markets for its alleged reduced risk products (Slide 22 of a 125 slide presentation titled ‘Reduced Risk 
Products Briefing’18) released by Reuters14 as part of a series of reports on PMI activities. PMI, Philip Morris International. 
PMI’s motives for creating the foundation were questioned 
by every major health authority group in the world, including 
the WHO, Union for International Cancer Control and 
the Union.50–52 In January 2018, the deans of 17 schools of public 
health in the USA and Canada issued a statement declaring that 
their school would not collaborate with the foundation because 
they considered funding from the Foundation as being funding 
from the tobacco industry, which these schools have rejected. 
Several scholars37 53 identified the foundation as another tobacco 
industry public relations campaign, similar to previous founda-
tions or research institutes the industry had created in the past 
to serve its political and public relations needs. The criticism 
also focused on the questionable independence of the foun-
dation from PMI54 and questioned the real intent behind the 
foundation’s research agenda. Like its predecessor organisa-
tions, the foundation captured a few scientists and academics 
to promote an agenda that overlaps significantly with PMI’s 
agenda, although research awards had not been announced as 
of April 2018.
dISCuSSIon
The launching of the latest incarnation of HTPs is a reprise55 of 
similar efforts in the past to use similar products to undermine 
tobacco control, particularly efforts that present the tobacco 
industry as a harm reduction partner.
As early as the 1960s, the tobacco companies developed 
alternative tobacco products with the goal of supplementing 
the cigarette market with products. A few of these products, 
such as RJ Reynolds (now Reynolds America, part of BAT) 
Premier and Eclipse and Philip Morris’ Accord and HeatBar 
were marketed but received poor ratings from customers, were 
commercial failures and were withdrawn.55 It is possible the 
companies were not more aggressive in making ‘reduced harm’ 
claims on new products because of legal concerns: Claiming 
that the new products were safer would amount to an admission 
that cigarettes were dangerous, opening the door for litigation 
and political difficulties for the tobacco industry, including 
FDA regulation of new products and cigarettes in the USA.56–58 
In addition, the FCTC did not ban cigarettes, one of the 
tobacco industry’s fears. All these factors laid the foundation 
for the wave of HTP reduced risk claims in several countries 
that accompanied new HTP products starting around 2014. 
The introduction of these new products may also have been a 
response to the growing popularity of e-cigarettes beginning 
around 2007 after independent companies introduced them 
before the major multinational tobacco companies entered 
the e-cigarettes market.55 57 Furthermore, the global decline 
of cigarette consumption and decrease in adult smoking prev-
alence (from 24% in 2007 to 21% in 2015), combined with 
the success of tobacco control, including implementation of 
the FCTC,59–62 may also have lead the tobacco companies to 
consider alternative products to protect their profits and polit-
ical interests. HTP serves both purposes by keeping consumers 
using the companies’ tobacco products while providing the 
industry with an avenue to lobby for exemptions from FCTC 
and similar national regulations by claiming that HTP would 
be good for public health.58 The PMI announcement in the 
UK47 has been identified as integral to the overall tobacco 
industry strategy to present a changed image to the public 
while continuing to promote nicotine addiction.36
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In the 1990s, with growing pressure from litigation in the USA 
and increasing engagement of the WHO in supporting tobacco 
control globally, the tobacco industry worked to create divisions 
within tobacco control while seeking to reposition itself politi-
cally as part of the ‘solution’ to the problems created by tobacco 
use.44 Philip Morris’ Project Sunrise, initiated in 1995, outlined 
a clear strategy to target certain individuals within the tobacco 
control community, question their credibility and integrity and 
work with them to promote alternative policy options that would 
be less harmful to the interests of the tobacco industry.38 Project 
Sunrise implemented Philip Morris’ 10-year strategy to posi-
tion itself as a ‘responsible’ company and a partner in tobacco 
control efforts, which would give heightened access to decision 
makers and the possibility to influence tobacco control regula-
tions. Despite Philip Morris’ efforts, global tobacco control did 
advance, with the FCTC entering into force in 2005.43
Since Project Sunrise, the tobacco industry has deployed a 
range of strategies to interfere with tobacco control, as described 
by the WHO.45 46 Among these strategies are efforts to create 
an image of ‘social responsibility’ and a commitment to work 
in partnership with governments to advance tobacco control, 
although neither of these initiatives have had any impact other 
than a public relations campaign for the tobacco industry.46 63–66 
Another significant strategy the tobacco industry used in the 
early 2000s was to promote voluntary, self-regulation in an 
effort to prevent the FCTC from entering into force. This volun-
tary self-regulation focused on marketing and youth smoking 
prevention programmes (YSP). Both voluntary marketing regu-
lation and industry-sponsored YSP have been demonstrated to 
be ineffective in addressing the tobacco epidemic.43 67–71
An integral part of the tobacco industry’s efforts is to promote 
a variety of its products in ways that imply, overtly or not, 
that they pose less harm than conventional cigarettes. Such 
misleading discourse accompanied the launch of cigarette filters, 
machine-measured lower-tar cigarettes, non-cigarette tobacco 
products such as snus and other smokeless tobacco.39 72 73 All 
these efforts sought to avoid marketing restrictions and influence 
policy makers to support self-regulation instead of a mandatory 
and more restrictive regulatory framework.42 43 46 Scientific 
evidence, on the other hand, demonstrated that filters, decreasing 
the number of cigarettes smoked a day or switching to a different 
type of cigarette are not viable risk reduction options. Similarly, 
as of 2018, the tobacco industry was producing its own science, 
and planning to fund scientists, in an effort to create evidence to 
support its claims.
However, emerging science indicated that HTP are unlikely 
to be any ‘healthier’ than conventional cigarettes, including 
scientific data submitted by PMI as part of its MRTP applica-
tion to the FDA.8 10 74–77 The industry’s claims are often specu-
lative, emphasising the ‘potential’ for these new products to 
either reduce harm or reduce risk of tobacco use.78 79 Addition-
ally, research has demonstrated that despite claims that there 
is not burning of tobacco, pyrolysis and charring occurs when 
using IQOS, releasing highly toxic formaldehyde cyanohydrin.80 
Others have shown that while there is a reduction is some toxic 
compounds, when comparing IQOS with regular cigarettes, these 
are not removed, and the clinical impact of exposure remains to 
be assessed.81 Nonetheless, the tobacco industry appears to be 
determined in using a ‘harm reduction’ frame in order to gain 
access to the policymaking table.
The tobacco industry’s use of the ‘harm reduction’ frame-
work also serves to fracture the tobacco control movement, 
leaving it without a unified voice to communicate with the 
public, the media and with policy makers on the strategies 
to advance tobacco control. The concept of harm reduction 
has traditionally been embraced in several public health fields 
such as clean needles for injectable drug use and has been 
explored by some tobacco control experts in the past,82 with 
enthusiasm for the possibility of harm reduction growing with 
the widespread availability of electronic cigarettes in certain 
markets.83–85 The tobacco industry frames harm reduction as 
a common ground with health advocates and a possible entry 
point to influence legislation and regulation of tobacco prod-
ucts.39 86 87
As described by Peeters and Gilmore,39 the 2001 Institute of 
Medicine report on the potential tobacco harm reduction (that 
was heavily influenced by industry interests88) appears to have 
provided support for tobacco industry efforts to reframe harm 
reduction as a viable tobacco control policy option and, more 
importantly, to position itself as pivotal to achieving such 
harm reduction goals. Thus, in the past decade and a half, the 
tobacco industry became a vocal proponent of tobacco harm 
reduction and has invested millions of US dollars in research 
and development of new products, such as HTP, which the 
tobacco industry is now using to gain access to scientists, 
opinion leaders and decision makers as a ‘solution’ to address 
the tobacco epidemic. Elias and Ling89 describe the role the 
tobacco industry played a role in funding the earliest efforts 
to promote ‘clean nicotine’ for harm reduction and conclude 
that the tobacco industry will continue to seek endorsement 
from health authorities to its proposition of HTP as a ‘harm 
reduction’ strategy.
If HTP manufacturers were seriously concerned about 
addressing the tobacco epidemic, they would immediately 
withdraw from dozens of court cases where they are chal-
lenging governments’ right to implement policies that protect 
the public’s health. Moreover, none of the tobacco compa-
nies that are promoting HTP have made any effort to actually 
reduce tobacco harm by curtailing marketing of tobacco prod-
ucts and has continued to vigorously oppose tobacco control 
measures and the implementation of the FCTC at national, 
regional and international levels.
FCTC Article 5.3
Governments that are a Party to the FCTC are urged to 
consider the regulatory options provided by the treaty when 
confronted with the tobacco industry’s pressure to enter new 
markets. There is nothing in the language of the treaty that 
precludes treating HTP as all other tobacco products (or a 
drug delivery system), including restriction of use in public 
places, applying labelling requirements, marketing restrictions 
and taxes.7 Additionally, Parties to the FCTC that choose to 
accept the tobacco industry as a stakeholder in addressing the 
tobacco epidemic are in breach of Article 5.3. Article 5.3 and 
its implementation guidelines90 clearly state that there is an 
‘irreconcilable conflict of interest’ between health policy and 
the tobacco industry. It further states that the tobacco industry 
is not, and could not, be a partner of governments in the 
implementation of tobacco control measures. Thus, govern-
ments must not engage, or participate, in tobacco industry-led 
‘harm reduction’ efforts.
ConCluSIon
The introduction of the latest generation of HTP appears to be 
the latest chapter in the decades-old tobacco industry strategy 
of working to create partnerships with governments and health 
advocates, presenting these alleged ‘harm reduction’ products 
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as an option to address the tobacco epidemic. While health 
authorities should keep an open mind if independent compel-
ling evidence that a true harm reducing tobacco product is 
developed and could support a harm reduction policy strategy, 
they should also keep in mind that the past has demonstrated 
that partnerships with industry benefit the corporate inter-
ests of the tobacco industry and harms countries’ health and 
development. The evidence available to date does not convinc-
ingly demonstrate that the available HTPs will simply replace 
conventional cigarettes among current smokers without 
attracting youth or even that these products will substantially 
reduce health risks among users. Nevertheless, the tobacco 
industry has a well-developed media, public relations and 
scientific strategy to undermine tobacco control through HTP. 
It is reaching out to governments and scientists to co-opt them 
to promote HTP.14 LMICs, and scientists in these countries, 
are vulnerable to the appeal of industry funding and must be 
supported in resisting partnering with the industry and, for 
countries that are Parties to the FCTC, breaching its interna-
tional commitments. It is unclear what impact, if any, multi-
lateral trade agreements will have on the expansion of HTP 
markets or the regulation of these new products.
Despite the rapid introduction of HTPs, as of April 2018, 
the vast majority of countries did not yet have these prod-
ucts, which creates a window of opportunity to address the 
tobacco industry’s latest ‘harm reduction’ offensive. But, time 
is of essence. The FCTC provides a legal framework that 
encourages countries to take a series of measures regarding 
novel tobacco products, from banning entry into market, to 
regulating advertisement, sales, packaging and use7 allowing 
Parties to address HTP before these products enter the market 
in an unregulated fashion.
What this paper adds
 ► After decades of increasing, global cigarette consumption 
is falling following implementation of the evidence-based 
policies in the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC).
 ► The tobacco companies are promoting heated tobacco 
products (HTP) as harm reduction as part of their effort to be 
‘part of the solution’ to the tobacco epidemic.
 ► The tobacco companies are using strategies that they have 
used for decades to fracture tobacco control and promote 
tobacco ‘harm reduction’ in an attempt to renormalise 
tobacco use.
 ► Tobacco companies are introducing HTP in markets with little 
or no regulatory or marketing restrains despite the fact that 
reduced risks claims are unproven and likely false.
 ► All FCTC regulatory measures should apply to HTP.
 ► Governments in countries where HTP are not available should 
keep them out and if allowed in the market at all should be 
under the strict regulatory framework defined by the FCTC.
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